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ARGUMENT
I:

THE PUBLIC HAS NO "RIGHT" TO USE PRIVATE ROADS.

Amicus Utah Association of Counties (UAC) asserts that it acts "on behalf of its
member counties who maintain thousands of miles of rural county public roads like the one
at issue in the present case." UAC further asserts that "[c]ounties in Utah are vitally
interested in maintaining the public nature of the roads which comprise the inventory of each
county's public transportation system."1 Two responses are appropriate. First, the trial court
specifically found that "the County has never maintained the roads" at issue in this case.2
The roads in this case are in remote areas that are not even accessible during the winter
months and have generally had little maintenance, if any.3
Second, and more importantly, it must be remembered that counties already have the
power of eminent domain to gain access to any private road deemed important to the county's
"public transportation system." UAC has not identified any statute or case authority that
gives the public any right to trespass over private land. The only real issue here is whether
the counties will be required to pay for the land.
Wasatch County argues that the balancing test of the court of appeals is an appropriate
way to resolve the "tension embedded in the nature of these road-dedication cases."4 The

'UAC brief, p. 1.
2

R. 419 ^4; see also RAS9^

I.

'Id. 4-5.
4

Wasatch County brief, p. 27.
1

supposed tension evaporates, however, if one recognizes that a landowner may abandon or
dedicate his or her roads to the public, but the public cannot take those roads without paying
just compensation.5 The focus should not be on whether the public has managed to trespass
with a certain frequency, but rather whether the landowner has acted so as to clearly
communicate an intent to retain the private character of the property.
Wasatch County claims the bright line standard is unworkable, because the public
could be prevented from taking the property by a single instance of a person being unable to
use the road.6 Past history belies this claim, because several cases reflect situations where
the statute worked - where a landowner dedicated his or her land to the public by failing to
make any effort to restrict public travel.7 More importantly, however, allowing an individual
to retain ownership is what the state and federal constitutions require. It should offend no
one that an individual is able to retain his or her private property by a single instance of
interrupting the ten-year statutory period.

5

Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1977).

6

Wasatch County brief, p. 29.

7

Kg., Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977) ("defendants
were unable to show that the use over the years prior to recent times was by permission of
the then owners."); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 396-97, 326 P.2d 107, 108 (1958) ("No
one testified that prior to the time respondent acquired the property in question permission
was asked or obtained from any owner to traverse the trail."); Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co.
v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 386, 285 P. 646, 647 (1929) ("substantially uncontradicted"
evidence established public use "without interference or objection on the part of the owners
of the land.")
2

II:

HIGHLIGHTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF
POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE STATUTE DID NOT
RAISE A NEW ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Wasatch County asserts that this Court should not consider Okelberrys' constitutional
arguments because they were raised for the first time on appeal. Okelberrys have not,
however, raised a new constitutional issue.
The first context in which Okelberrys referred to constitutional principles was to argue
that the statute must be interpreted in a way that avoids constitutional conflicts.8 Okelberrys
do not claim that the road dedication statute is unconstitutional if interpreted correctly.
Okelberrys had argued before the court of appeals that any interruption of use was enough
to preserve the private character of property.9 Okelberrys make that same argument to this
Court, and in addition argue that any other conclusion would violate the constitutional
protections of private property. This is not raising a new issue, but only making additional
arguments in support of a prior claim.
Okelberrys also referred to constitutional principles to explain the presumptions in
favor of preserving private property.

The court of appeals recognized these strong

presumptions.10 This was not a new issue.

Okelberrys' opening brief, p. 18.
9

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473, 153 P.3d 745, \ 14.

10

Okelberrys 16.
3

It should be expected that arguments presented to this Court will not be exact
repetitions of arguments made below. This Court has previously approved going beyond the
arguments made to the trial court so long as a new issue is not raised.11
This Court should consider Okelberrys' constitutional arguments as additional reasons
to adopt the arguments Okelberrys made to the court of appeals.
Ill:

THE LOWER COURTS ASSUMED THE ROADS HAD BEEN
PERIODICALLY BLOCKED BUT ERRONEOUSLY HELD IT
DID NOT MATTER.

Okelberrys argued in their opening brief that the trial court assumed the truth of
Okelberrys' evidence. Wasatch County asserts that ff[t]his representation of the findings is
only partially correct, and to the extent the court of appeals assumed that this was the trial
court's finding or conclusion, it was mistaken."12 Wasatch County asserts that the trial court
"assuming the truth" statement in paragraph 4 of its Conclusions of Law referred only to the
evidence described in paragraph 3 of the initial findings of fact.13 Wasatch County further
asserts that the statements by the trial court were only an acknowledgment that "even if
certain Okelberry claims were true, the evidence would still require a conclusion that the four
roads were dedicated to the public."14

"Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dalgleish, 2002 UT 59, | 14 n. 5, 52 P.3d 1142.
12

Wasatch County brief, p. 8.

13

Wasatch County brief, p. 9.

{4

Id.

4

In one sense, the County is correct. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the trial court's initial
conclusions of law reveal the trial court's conclusion that because a substantial number of
people used the roads as often as they found it convenient or necessary, it did not matter that
the use of some people was blocked, that gates were locked for several days at a time, and
that no trespassing signs were posted on the property. In other words, the trial court rejected
Okelberrys claim that "any interruption of public access during the relevant period is enough
to prevent use from being continuous."15
But, there is nothing in the wording of paragraph 4 of the initial conclusions of law
to limit its assumption of Okelberrys' evidence as true to only the statements in the preceding
paragraph 3. And, the court of appeals did not treat the trial court's assumption as being so
limited. Before commenting that the trial court assumed the truth of Okelberrys factual
assertions, the court of appeals described at least one factual element not included in
paragraph 3 of the trial court's conclusions of law: "employees of the Okelberrys testified
that they had, at times, asked people trespassing on the property or the roads to leave."16 This
testimony is reflected in paragraph 16 of the trial court's findings of fact,17 not in paragraph
3 of the conclusions of law.

l5

Id.%3.

l6

0kelberry^5.

17

R.417.
5

Because this Court on certiorari reviews the decision of the court of appeals and not
the trial court,18 this Court should also assume the truth of Okelberrys evidence. This Court
should thus conclude that this appeal does not present a factual dispute, but a legal one: is
"any interruption of public access" sufficient, or must there be two interruptions, or three,
or many?
In answering this legal question, this Court should treat the following facts as true,
consistent with the assumptions of the court of appeals and the trial court:
•

"There were also multiple wire gates along the Four Roads such that persons
traveling on the Four Roads generally had to open the gates before proceeding
within the boundaries of the Okelberrys property."19 Okelberrys demonstrated on
pages 35-38 of their opening brief that gates alone, even without locks, constitute
an interruption sufficient to defeat abandonment to the public.

•

The gates were "generally kept closed" and "periodically locked for several days
at a time."20 Contrary to the statements of Wasatch County on pages 4 and 11 of
its brief, this periodic locking was prior to 1990. The trial court stated that
Okelberrys locked the gates "[a]t various times in the past." The trial court then
explained that the pattern changed in the 1990s, when Okelberrys began locking

n

State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23, U 5, 156 P.3d 795.

l9

Okelberry, f 2.

20

Id. Tf 5 (internal quotation marks omitted); R. 415 Tf 3.
6

the gates "on a more permanent basis."21 For the locking to be on a "more"
permanent basis in the 1990s, there must have been some locking of the gates
before then. The trial court expressly found that this locking occurred "at various
times in the past."22
•

The gates were kept closed for the purpose of restricting travel on the roads.23

•

"No Trespassing-Private Property" signs were posted on the gates and on the
property.24

•

Employees of Okelberrys had, at times, asked people trespassing on the roads to
leave.25

As explained in Okelberrys' opening brief and above in this brief, the trial court in
essence held that because many people ignored the no-trespassing signs and used the property
without interruption, it did not matter that Okelberrys did periodically prevent public use of
their private property. This holding was in error and contrary to established decisions of this
Court.

21

R. 488^5.

21

Id.

23

R. 4161f 17.

24

0kelberry | 5; R. 415 1fl[ 3-4; R. 488 ^ 6.

25

0kelberry ^ 5; R. 417 % 16.
7

IV:

ANY INTERRUPTION THAT EVIDENCES AN INTENT TO
EXERCISE CONTROL OVER PRIVATE PROPERTY SHOULD
BE ADEQUATE TO RETAIN PRIVATE OWNERSHIP.

The starting point in any statutory construction case is the language of the statute. The
statute here provides that a "highway" becomes public when it has been "continuously used
as a public thoroughfare" for 10 years.26 This Court has interpreted "continuously" to be
synonymous with "without interruption."27 As interpreted by the court of appeals and as
advocated by the counties, the test becomes instead whether interruptions were frequent and
extensive.
Quoting Boyer v. Clark,2* Wasatch County argues that continuous use exists whenever
the public used the road "as often as they found it convenient or necessary."29 In Boyer,
however, there was no claim that anyone tried to restrict use in any manner prior to 12 years
before the case was commenced, and there was testimony of over 50 years unrestricted use
before that.30 The quoted language in Boyer was only to establish that "continuous" use does
not require constant use. Boyer therefore does not support the proposition argued by
Wasatch County, and adopted by the trial court, that a road becomes public if many members
of the public use the road without restriction. In the later case of Draper City v. Estate of

26

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2006).

21

See Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d948, 949 (Utah 1977). Accord AWINC
Corp. v. Simonsen,2005\JTApp 168, Tj 11,112P.3d 1228,1230-31, and cases cited therein.
28

7 Utah 2d 395, 397, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (1958).

29

Wasatch County brief, p. 7.

30

7 Utah 2d at 396-97, 326 P.2d at 108.
8

Bernardo?l there was evidence that members of the general public had made "continual" use
of the road for "hiking, camping, horseback riding, and riding motorized vehicles."32 This
Court there held that testimony that "some of them" were stopped and asked to leave could
defeat the public road claim. Id.
Wasatch County and UAC also argue that Thurman v. Byram33 establishes that an
occasional interruption does not prevent a road from becoming public. In contrast to the
instant case, however, the trial court in Thurman specifically found there had been no
interruption of public use. In the instant case the trial court made no such finding, but held
that evidence of interruption did not matter because there was extensive public use. The only
undisputed "interruption" in Thurman was a periodic closing of gates to facilitate the
movement of sheep.34 There was no finding that the landowner had made any attempt to
preclude use of the road by members of the public. Thurman therefore does not support the
conclusion that interruptions of public use must be frequent or extensive.
Wasatch County asserts that gates alone should not constitute an interruption of use,
and argues that gates are no more interruptive than a fallen tree, an animal, or rain or snow.35
The difference, of course, is that a gate communicates that the property is private. Given that

31

888P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995).

31

ld.atll00.

33

626P.2d 447 (Utah 1981).

34

Id. at 449.

35

Wasatch County brief, p. 24.
9

the only constitutional justification for the statute is voluntary abandonment or dedication,
actions showing an intent to retain control of the property should be sufficient to prevent a
finding of continuous use.36
Wasatch County argues that the purpose of the gates was to control the sheep.37 The
trial court, however, acknowledged that the testimony showed the gates were kept closed for
the purpose of restricting travel on the roads, as well as for livestock control.38 Also, the
testimony was that the gates were locked while moving the sheep, not merely closed.39
Because a closed gate would have been as effective at keeping sheep in as a locked gate, it
is apparent the purpose of the locks was to keep people out. Closing or locking a gate to
keep people out while moving sheep is much different than closing a gate to keep sheep in.
UAC argues that the evidence supporting the existence of gates prior to 1990 is "spare
and stinting as best."40 An examination of the evidence, however, highlights the policy
reasons why a single interruption should preserve private property. UAC notes that one
witness testified the gate of Circle Springs Road always had a chain and lock, but that every

26

See Okelberrys' opening brief, pp. 17-18.

37

Wasatch County brief, p. 25.

38

R. 416%7.

39

Ray Okelberry testified that he had made a habit of locking at least some of the gates
every year while the sheep were being moved. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 13 8-39. This was
supported by Mel Price. Mel Price began accessing the property in approximately 1972, Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 154, and testified that the gates had "always been locked" as far back
as he could remember. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 160, 170.
40

UAC brief, p. 13.
10

week the gate was put up, it was ripped out the next day.41 UAC further admits that Lee
Okelberry testified that a gate could not be kept on that road,42 that he further testified that
the gates themselves were disappearing43 and that Ray Okelberry testified that locks were
removed.44 If this Court were to hold that a gate is insufficient to preserve private property
and that trespassers gain rights by destroying gates, landowners will be forced to resort to
more drastic and potentially deadly measures to prevent public access. Particularly with
remote mountain roads, landowners should not be expected to create an impenetrable barrier
along miles of property boundaries.
Wasatch County characterizes Okelberrys as "trying to paint a picture of the evidence
presented at trial as showing limited use by a few individuals."45 Okelberrys do not make
that claim, but argue that the volume of use is irrelevant. Whether the roads are used by
61,000 persons per day on BYU campus, or by only an occasional deer hunter on a remote
mountain road, the principles for preserving private property should be the same. It is the
fact of interruption (acts showing an intent to retain private control) that is important.
The dictionary defines "continuous" as "marked by uninterrupted extension in space,
time, or sequence."46 If use is interrupted, it is not continuous. Wasatch County and UAC
4l

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id p. 16

44

Id.p. 17-18

45

Wasatch County brief, p. 12.

46

Merriarn-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 251 (10th ed. 1993).
11

have cited no case holding to the contrary. The new rule of the court of appeals, requiring
proof of interruption that outweighs the use, finds no support in the statute or opinions of this
Court.
Similarly lacking statutory or case support is the argument of Wasatch County and
UAC that interruption of use on a rural road must be more extensive than interruption on
BYU campus. Neither Wasatch County nor UAC seems to dispute that BYU maintains its
private ownership by closing roads once a year on the day (Christmas) when the closure is
least likely to actually interrupt anyone's planned use.47 Paradoxically, Wasatch County and
UAC argue that closure of rural roads must occur at a time and for a duration that actually
significantly interferes with use, yet operation of the balancing test posited by the court of
appeals would dictate the opposite result. The real lesson is that the balancing test is
unsound.
This Court should reject the balancing test of the court of appeals and hold that the
private nature of property may be preserved by interrupting public use once during the tenyear statutory period.48

47

BYU brief, p. 4, states that closures are timed to "allow as much public access as
possible." UAC's argument (UAC brief, p. 28) that BYU interferes with 61,000 drivers by
closing its roads on Christmas Day has no support in fact or logic.
48

0f course, if the factfinder determines the landowner's evidence is not credible and
that use was not interrupted even once, then the road would become public.
12

V:

TO PRESERVE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS, THIS COURT
SHOULD LIMIT THE DISCRETION GIVEN TO TRIAL
COURTS; THIS IS NOT A NEW ISSUE.

Okelberrys' opening brief in this Court asserted that the discretion given to the trial
court on a mixed question of fact and law should be significantly limited where constitutional
issues are involved.49 Wasatch County opposes this argument as being raised for the first
time. But, the title of first point of Okelberrys' opening brief in the court of appeals was "In
Reviewing the Merits of this Appeal, This Court's Deference to the Trial Court is Limited
by the Trial Courts' Own Independent Obligations to Protect the Rights of Property Owners
in Public Roads Cases."50 The rights of property owners are protected by the constitutional
provisions cited in Okelberrys' opening brief in this Court. Although those constitutional
provisions were not cited to the court of appeals, the principles were argued. This is
sufficient to preserve the issue.51
This Court in State v. Pena52 recognized that the discretion granted to a trial court
should be limited where constitutional issues are involved. The Court also noted that it is
occasionally appropriate to "contract the size of the pasture in response to things we learn
over time."53 This is such a case. The highly deferential balancing test created by the court

49

0kelberrys' opening brief, p. 8.

50

A copy of the brief is attached.

5l

See State v. Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, % 10.

52

869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).

53

/</.at938.
13

of appeals violates constitutional private property rights. This Court should hold that clear
and convincing evidence of continuous public use does not exist where there is credible,
unrebutted evidence of interruption.
The court of appeals expressed the concern that the public road statute would be
eviscerated if a public road claim could be defeated by a property owner's "self-serving
testimony that at some point she interrupted use of a road."5* Of course, if the trial court
finds the "self-serving testimony" lacks credibility, the trial court need give it no weight. If,
however, the trial court finds that use was interrupted (as the trial court assumed here), then
the trial court should not be given discretion to weigh the quality of that interruption against
the volume of public use. To do so violates the statutory requirement of continuous
(uninterrupted) use and takes private property without just compensation.
VI:

WASATCH COUNTY DID NOT CROSS-PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI REVIEW, AND MAY NOT DISPUTE THAT
OKELBERRYS REPRESENTED THE INTERESTS OF WEST
DANIELS LAND ASSOCIATION.

Wasatch County asserts in its statement of the case that a default was entered against
West Daniels Land Association.55 The court of appeals specifically held, however, that
Okelberrys represented the interest of the Association and that the rights to the Association's
property were adjudicated at trial, rather than by default.56 Wasatch County did not file a

Okelberry,\ 17.
Wasatch County brief, p. 2.
'Okelberry, \ 2 n. 1.
14

cross-petition on this issue and is bound by the ruling of the court of appeals.57 Any ruling
of this Court regarding the land of Okelberrys should apply equally to the land of West
Daniels Land Association.
CONCLUSION
The balancing test created by the court of appeals violates private property rights and
is not supported by the statutory language. Public use is not "continuous" if it is interrupted
even once. This Court should reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the
trial court for further proceedings.
DATED this j ^ d a y of August, 2007.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners

51

See In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Utah 1997).
15
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(j) (2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARDS OF REVIEW
L

Whether a county can obtain control over privately owned roads under Utah Code

Annotated § 72-5-104 (2005), where the private landowner has routinely expelled persons
who were found using those roads without permission, and where the landowner has also
maintained and locked gates controlling access to those roads during the pendency of his
ownership.
This issue was tried in a bench trial from June 28-30, 2004. The trial transcript can
be found in the appellate record.1 This is a mixed question of law and fact. As such, the
appellate court reviews the trial court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous
standard, but reviews the ultimate determination for correctness. See AWINC Corp. v.
Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, TJ1J7-8, 112 P.3d 1228.
2.

Whether the trial court was correct in estopping the government from exerting

control over a road system, where the government has sat idly collecting taxes on the
roads while the property owners maintained and used these roads for a period of decades.
This issue presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Ledfors v.
Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 1162, 1162-63 (Utah 1993).

though the trial transcript has been included in the appellate record, the volumes
have not been paginated for purposes of the record. As such, all references to the transcript
shall be in the following format: Trial Transcript, June (date) at (page number).
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The determinative provision with respect to the road issue is Utah Code Annotated
§ 72-5-104. The determinative provisions with respect to the estoppel issue are set forth
in Wasatch County's opening brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wasatch County filed suit on August 24, 2001. R. at 10. In its Complaint, the
County asked for a declaration that five roads that cross over the Appellees' private
property have been abandoned to the public under Utah Code Annotated § 72-5-104. R.
at 8-10. Specifically, the County sought dedication of the roads referred to as Ridge Line
Road, Parker Canyon Road, Thornton Hollow Road, Circle Springs Road, and Maple
Canyon Road. R. at 9. The matter was tried in a bench trial from June 28-30, 2004, and
the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law on October 22, 2004. R.
at 407. In that decision, the court determined that the County had met its § 72-5-104
burden with respect to Ridge Line, Parker Canyon, Thornton Hollow, and Circle Springs,
but that it had not met its burden with respect to Maple Canyon. R. at 413, ^[8. The trial
court then estopped the County from exercising control over the four dedicated roads. R.
at411,1[13.
The County filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on October 28, 2004,
arguing that the estoppel ruling was improper. R. at 431. After further briefing and
argument, the trial court issued its Supplemental Findings of Fact and Ruling on Motion
to Amend Judgment (the Supplemental Findings) on February 23, 2005. R. at 489. In the
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Supplemental Findings, the trial court did amend some of its earlier factual findings, but
still denied the County's challenge to the estoppel ruling. An Order to that effect was
signed by the trial court on April 8, 2005. R. at 492. On April 22, 2005, the County filed
a Notice of Appeal, challenging the trial court's conclusion that it is estopped from
claiming control over the four contested roads. R. at 495. The County did not include a
challenge to any of the trial court's factual findings, nor did it challenge the trial court's
conclusion that Maple Canyon is still a private road. On April 28, 2005, the Okelberrys
filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal, challenging the trial court's conclusion that the
requirements of § 72-5-104 had been met with respect to any of the roads in this case. R.
at 509.2
2

A note regarding the involvement of West Daniels Land Association is required here.
The Court will note from the attached map that portions of Ridge Line Road and the entirety
of Parker Canyon Road are actually located on property owned by the West Daniels Land
Association (West Daniels). As recounted in Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Ass'n., 2005 U T
App 327,120 P.3d 34, West Daniels was a land association that was formed in 1952 to purchase
and manage grazing land for its members. I d at ^[2. The land that West Daniels purchased and
managed is immediately adjacent to the Okelberrys' private ground. As set forth in the
Okelberry opinion, the Okelberrys were members of West Daniels, and used the West Daniels
land in conjunction with their own lands as part of their grazing operations. IdL at ^[2-9. After
the West Daniels board began limiting the Okelberrys' ability to graze on association lands,
however, the Okelberrys filed a lawsuit against the association. While that lawsuit was pending,
this action was filed by the County regarding these roads. These two lawsuits have proceeded
concurrently with one another.
For reasons that are not fully explained in this record, the attorney representing West
Daniels withdrew from this litigation early on, and no successor counsel was appointed. R. at
419, *p. Less than two months before trial, the County asked the trial court for entry of a
default summary judgment against West Daniels. R. at 279. The Okelberrys objected to that
motion, arguing that (1) as owners of over one-third of the shares in West Daniels, they had the
right to assert its interests in this trial, and (2) indicating that they would be presenting evidence
regarding the West Daniels roads at that upcoming trial. R. at 284-85. The County responded
by asserting that the Okelberrys lacked standing to represent West Daniels' interests with respect
to the road litigation. R. at 311-12.
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There is no evidence that the trial court actually entered any ruling on the County's
motion. See Record Index to appellate file. As a result, the West Daniels roads were litigated
at trial. Specifically, the County presented evidence of public use, and the Okelberrys presented
evidence showing restriction on those West Daniels roads. In its Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law, the trial court addressed the motion for default summary judgment for the
first time. The court first mistakenly asserted that default had actually been entered against West
Daniels. The trial court then noted, however, that the parties had litigated these roads at trial.
R. at 419, ^|7. By allowing presentation of evidence regarding this road, the trial court therefore
appears to have at least implicidy concluded (1) that its "default judgment" (which, again, had
never actually been announced or entered) had been de facto overruled, and (2) that the
Okelberrys' request as minority shareholders for lea^e to represent West Daniels' interests
regarding these roads had been granted. As such, the trial court's ruling adjudicated these issues
with respect to the West Daniels roads as well.
T h e C o u n t y filed a m o t i o n to a m e n d
judgment following the issuance of the court's ruling. Throughout the consideration of that
motion, neither the County nor the trial court objected to the decision to allow the Okelberrys
to present evidence and argue the merits of the West Daniels roads. Further, in filing both its
notice of appeal and its opening brief in this matter, the County has still not objected to the trial
court's decision to allow the Okelberrys to represent West Daniels' interests in this matter. For
example, the County's opening brief specifically references the evidence with respect to Parker
Canyon, and makes no mention of there being anything improper about the Okelberrys
continuing to defend the private nature of that road. As such, to the extent that the County may
have had an argument relating to the Okelberrys' ability as minority shareholders to assert West
Daniels' interests either at trial or on appeal, that argument has been waived. See, e.g., Utah
Ass'n of Counties v. Tax Comm'n of State, 895 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1995) (allowing appeUate
participation by a potential non-party where that potential non-party had actively participated
at trial and had therefore been implicidy allowed to intervene).
It is additionally worth noting that all of the shares of stock in West Daniels were
purchased by a single buyer during the summer of 2005-i.e., after the conclusion of the trial and
the filings of the respective Notices of Appeal. That buyer supports the position taken by the
Okelberrys with respect to this appeal, and has also specifically consented to the Okelberrys'
continued representation of West Daneils' interests with respect to these roads.
For these reasons, this brief will address the merits of all of the roads still in dispute
without regard to any ownership issues that may have existed between the Okelberrys and West
Daniels. For simplicity's sake, no effort will be made to distinguish between the Okelberry and
West Daniels properties except where specifically necessary.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The roads in question run across several thousand acres of rural, undeveloped
property that is owned by the Okelberrys in Wasatch County. Ray Okelberry, his brother
Lee Okelberry, and their father first purchased this property in 1957. Trial Transcript,
June 30 at 61-62. The Okelberrys ran a sheep business, and bought the mountainous
property in order to relocate their herds to a higher, cooler elevation. Trial Transcript,
June 30 at 61. Ray and Lee Okelberry ultimately bought out their father's interest in the
land, and, after Lee decided to retire from the business, Ray's sons Eric and Brian
Okelberry then bought out Lee's interest. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 62. At the present
time, Ray, Eric, and Brian Okelberry own the land in question and continue to use it in
their own livestock operations.
The Okelberrys' property is crisscrossed by a series of unimproved dirt roads. A
color-coded map of the properties in question was attached as an exhibit during the
pretrial proceedings, R. at 371, and, for convenience, is reproduced and attached as an
exhibit to this brief. Evidence was presented at trial indicating that the County has not
done any work to improve the physical condition of the roads. Findings of Fact, R. at
419, Tf4; Supplemental Findings, R. at 489, ^2; Trial Transcript, June 28 at 25-26; Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 57; Trial Transcript, June 30 at 80. The evidence presented at trial
also indicated that, due to weather, the roads are only open for travel from Mid-May or
June through November of each year. Findings of Fact, R. at 419, f 5; Trial Transcript,
June 28 at 61. To the extent that these roads can actually be referred to as "roads," the
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evidence showed that they are rough, steep, rocky, and often obstructed by naturally
falling trees. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 285 (testimony of County witness Ed
Sabey, describing recurrence of falling trees); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 97 (testimony
of County witness Benny Gardner, describing the roads as "rough" and "steep"); Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 238-39 (testimony of Shane Ford, describing roads as "rocky" and
"rough"); Trial Transcript, June 30 at 26 (testimony of Brian Okelberry, describing need
for yearly tree removal).3
As indicated at trial, there are four ways in which the landowners have controlled
access to the roads since 1957: (1) by granting permission to some people to use the
roads, and then by expelling persons who were found on the roads without permission; (2)

3

There was a minor dispute at trial regarding just how rough and rocky particular
portions of the roads were. The testimony regarding Ridge Line road is instructive on this
point. Gerald Thompson, testifying for the County, testified that he was able to take a 1955
Ford "car" up Ridge Line. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 247. By contrast, Mark Butters, also
testifying for the County, testified that that same road is "very narrow," "very steep," "awful
rocky," and that a vehicle's sides are scraped by the trees and shrubbery as it drives through.
Trial Transcript, June 29 at 116-18. Finally, in their case in chief, the Okelberrys presented
testimony that Ridge Line is inaccessible to a non-4 wheel drive vehicle even in the summer
months. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 140 (testimony of Jeff Jefferson); Trial Transcript, June
29 at 157 (testimony of Mel Price); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 211 (testimony of Glen
Shepherd).
As will be set forth in the Argument section of this brief, the ultimate resolution of
this appeal does not hinge on a decision regarding what type of vehicle would be needed to
traverse the particular roads during particular seasons. The questions before this Court are
instead focused on the nature and extent of the man-made obstacles to public use. As a
general matter, however, it is worth noting as background that even the County's evidence
tended to show that these roads are narrow, rocky, unpaved roads that are only passable by
vehicles for a period of approximately 6 months of the year.
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by maintaining a series of closed gates that cross each of the roads; (3) by periodically
locking those gates; and (4) by posting no-trespassing signs along the roads.
Permission and Expulsion4
From the time that the Okelberrys purchased the property, they treated it and the
roads that crossed it as private ground that was subject to their control. One of the chief
ways in which the Okelberrys protected their private property rights was by granting
permission to friends or neighbors to use the roads, and by expelling persons who they
found using the roads without permission. At trial, Ray Okelberry specifically testified
that as far back as 1957, he, Lee, and their father were granting permission-both orally
and in writing-to friends and neighbors to use the roads. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 81.
Ray Okelberry supported this testimony by presenting copies of permission slips that he
had given to persons that he knew. One such slip, admitted as Defense Exhibit 28, read
as follows: "I, Ray Okelberry, give permission to Brian Gardner and his folks to go
through or around my locked gates, and permission to use my roads to access my
property in Wasatch County." Trial Transcript, June 30 at 83-84 (emphasis added). Ray
Okelberry also presented a copy of a note that he had left on a car that was found on his
property, informing the owner that he or she was trespassing. Trial Transcript, June 30 at
82. Brian Okelberry offered similar testimony regarding the Okelberrys' attempt to limit
access to these roads by granting or withdrawing permission. See Trial Transcript, June

"^The evidence relating to this factor presented at trial appears to have been exclusive to
the Okelberry roads, and does not apply to the West Daniels roads.
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30 at 35-36. Specifically, Brian testified that he and his family would routinely grant
permission to people they knew to come up and "use the roads and to hunt" on their
property, and that the Okelberrys in later years even made a practice of charging persons
for this road usage and hunting right. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 35.
At trial, several witnesses supported the assertion that the Okelberrys had been
controlling access to the roads by granting permission and then expelling non-permissive
users. Bruce Huvard, a longtime friend of the Okelberrys, testified that he has been using
the roads with their specific permission since 1966. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 252, 261.
Mr. Huvard also affirmatively testified that, between 1966 and 1990, he was asked by the
Okelberrys to "kick people off the property if he came upon them and learned that they
did not have permission to be there. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 266. During one
exchange at trial, Mr. Huvard testified about his role as follows:
Q: During this period of time from 1966 to 1990 do you know if other people
obtained permission to use those roads?
A: They did.
Q: Do you know if other people used those roads that did not have permission?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you know if they were asked to leave?
A: When I was personally hunting there I would ask them to leave if they didn't
have permission.
Trial Transcript, June 29 at 256.
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Mel Price similarly testified. He stated that he has been using the roads since
1974. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 153. He also specifically stated that he has asked for
permission to use the roads during every year since then, and then authenticated a
permission slip that he had received from Ray Okelberry granting him permission to
"access all of my private roads on my private land." Trial Transcript, June 29 at 163-65.
He further testified that his uncles and nephew have also received permission to use the
roads from the Okelberrys, and that he had always understood that wCa person needed
permission to use the roads." Trial Transcript, June 29 at 166.
Jeff Jefferson testified regarding the permission/expulsion protocols as well. Mr.
Jefferson started working for the Okelberrys on their property in 1977, and has worked
there every summer since then. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 130, 143. Mr. Jefferson
stated that the Okelberrys had a policy that when one of their employees saw someone on
the property, the employee was to approach the person, ask if they had permission, and
then ask them to leave if they didn't have permission. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 141. In
fact, Mr. Jefferson specifically testified that he had had to ask one of the County's
witnesses, Mark Butters, to leave the property on two different occasions. Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 141. As to the question of whether the expulsion policy was for the
Okelberry roads and property, or whether it just applied to the Okelberry property itself,
Mr. Jefferson was unequivocal that it applied to the property and the roads. On crossexamination, the following exchange occurred:
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Q: You indicated that any time you saw people on the property you'd ask them to
leave; is that correct?
A: That's correct.
Q: Is that any time you saw people driving on the roads?
A: Well, I'd ask if they, they had permission to be on there, 'cause I was informed
that it wasn't a public access, you know, for people to be on there. So if they
didn't have permission I would ask them to leave.
Q: When you say on there, do you mean on the roads or on the property?
A: Well, most of the time when people came on there they wouldn't stay on the
road.
Q: So people you talked to were people that were off the road on property, is that
what you're saying?
A: No-I'd run into people like that and on the road. And I'd ask them if they're
supposed to be on there.
Q: Would you chase them down with your horseA:No.
Q: -or how would you talk to them?
A: Just as I was coming up the road I'd run into them. Try to do it nice, polite.
Trial Transcript, June 29 at 148-49 (emphasis added).
In further support of this assertion, Glen Shepherd testified that he has specifically
asked for and received written permission from the Okelberrys to use their roads. Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 212, 220. Similarly, Shane Ford testified that he and his extended
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family have routinely used the roads and the property, with specific permission from the
Okelberrys for both. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 230-31.
Fences and Gates
At the time that the Okelberrys purchased the property in 1957, the Okelberrys'
property was bordered by fences. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 147 (testimony of
James Bessendorfer); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 174 (testimony of Lee Okelberry); Trial
Transcript, June 30 at 62 (testimony of Ray Okelberry). These border fences have
remained in place throughout the Okelberrys' period of ownership. It appears to be
undisputed that there have also oeen wire gates across the contested roads since at least
1957. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 39, 43, 48, 62, 64 (testimony of Dee Sabey
that there have "always" been gates); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 174 (testimony of Lee
Okelberry); Trial Transcript, June 30 at 24 (testimony of Brian Okelberry indicating that
there are both internal "pasture gates" and external gates "at each place that [the roads]
goes on and off West Daniels" land); Trial Transcript, June 30 at 62, 137 (testimony of
Ray Okelberry).5
As indicated by the Okelberrys, the purpose of these gates was twofold. First, the
gates were used as a means of controlling the movement of the sheep and cattle within the

5

As per common practice, these gates are designed to be "let down" in the winter to
avoid being knocked out of position by the snowfall. Though there was some testimony that
some members of the public had ridden snowmobiles across these roads during the winter,
the trial court did not rely on this particular form of use as part of its ruling and this usage is
accordingly not addressed herein.
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Okelberry property. See Trial Transcript, June 30 at 25 (testimony of Brian Okelberry);
Trial Transcript, June 30 at 138 (testimony of Ray Okelberry). Second, the gates were
also kept closed by the Okelberrys and their employees as a means of controlling
vehicular and pedestrian traffic. In a pretrial affidavit that was filed with the Court, for
example, Lee Okelberry testified that the family had attempted to control access to the
roads through "fences and gates." R. at 192, ^|5. At trial, Brian Okelberry also
specifically testified that "one of the purpose[s] of the gates" was "to control vehicles
from going up and down the roads," Trial Transcript, June 30 at 25, and then later
expressed his belief that the gates had been a sufficient means of asserting private control
over the roads:
Q: Based upon your recollection and experience up there, do you have an opinion
whether those roads have been open to the public and have been used continually
during these summer months?
A: Not-Not-In my time we haven't opened them. We closed the gates and tried to
put a little control on it.
Trial Transcript, June 30 at 43. This assertion that there was a dual purpose for the gates
was also backed up by Glen Shepherd, who at the time of trial had used the roads for 35
years and has been a neighbor of the Okelberrys for the past 14 years. See Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 208. At trial, Mr. Shepherd testified that the gates have been kept
closed "as far back as [he could] remember" and that his understanding was that the gates
were kept closed, in part, to restrict the flow of persons. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 219.
This assertion was also backed up by Jeff Jefferson, who worked as a rancher for the
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Okelberrys every summer from 1977 through 2003. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 130, 143.
According to Mr. Jefferson, the purpose of the gates was to control both the livestock and
the public. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 135.
As for the West Daniels roads, the above testimony has obvious applicability to
those roads with respect to the points at which Ridge Line runs onto and off of the West
Daniels property. Additionally, testimony at trial also indicated that there were gates
across Parker Canyon as well. See Trial Transcript, June 28 at 46-47 (testimony of Dee
Sabey that there were gates on Parker Canyon); Trial Transcript, June 28 at 278
(testimony of Ed Sabey that there were gates across Parker Canyon).
Locks on the Gates
The Okelberrys presented testimony that they have been locking the gates on a
periodic basis. Admittedly, there was some question at trial regarding the frequency and
scope with which those gates have been locked. Ray Okelberry affirmatively testified, for
example, that he had begun locking the exterior gates as early as 1958 or 1959, and that
the interior gates within his property have been locked for approximately the past 20
years. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 135-37. More importantly, Ray Okelberry testified
that he had made a habit of locking at least some of the gates every year while the sheep
were being moved. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 138-39. This was supported by Mel
Price. Mel Price began accessing the property in approximately 1972, Trial Transcript,
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June 29 at 154, and testified that the gates had "always been locked" as far back as he
could remember. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 160, 170.
Conversely, Brian Okelberry testified that, at least according to his memory, the
exterior gates had only been locked since the 1980s, Trial Transcript, June 30 at 54, while
Lee Okelberry could not remember ever having personally locked the gates himself. Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 196. Additionally, the County presented testimony from several
persons who indicated that they had never encountered a locked gate. See, e.g.. Trial
Transcript, June 28 at 35, 40, 43, 48 (Dee Sabey); Trial Transcript, June 28 at 112, 119,
125 (James Bessendorfer).
After considering the evidence, the trial court accepted Ray Okelberry's contention
that the gates were periodically locked while the sheep were being moved. The court thus
found that the Okelberrys have "locked those gates for periods of time" prior to
"completely controlling] access" through constant locking in 1989. Supplemental
Findings, R. at 486. That finding has not been challenged on appeal by the County.
Signs
Finally, the evidence also indicates that the Okelberrys placed no trespassing signs
along their roads as a means of informing the public that use was restricted. Ray
Okelberry testified that he had started putting these signs up almost immediately upon
purchasing the property in the late 1950s. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 137. Other
witnesses confirmed the existence of these signs throughout the relevant period. Bruce
Huvard, for example, specifically remembered seeing the no trespassing signs up as of
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1966. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 257-58, 268-69. Mel Price, who has been using the
roads since the early 1970s, stated that there had been no trespassing signs posted along
the roads as far back as he could remember. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 160. Brian
Okelberry similarly testified that there are signs on each of the boundary gates. Trial
Transcript, June 30 at 25. Jeff Jefferson also testified that "all entrances" were marked
with a sign stating "no trespassing or keep out." Trial Transcript, June 29 at 135.
Evidence also indicated that the West Daniels roads were marked with no trespassing
signs as well. See Trial Transcript, June 29 at 161; Trial Transcript, June 29 at 212.
Following trial, the trial court concluded that the County had met its § 72-5-104
burden with respect to the contested roads. Specifically, the trial court concluded that
there had been uninterrupted public use of the roads from 1960 until 1989. R. at 413, ^|8.6

6

Though the trial court did specifically determine that there had been "no public use of
the various roads in the 1940s or before and also that no evidence of vehicular use prior to the
1950s existed," Findings of Fact, R. at 417, ^}10, the Court was somewhat ambiguous regarding
the exact years for which the court believed § 72-5-104 had been satisfied. For example, in its
discussion of the continuous use factor, the court determined that individuals had begun "using
the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s." R. at 415,1f4. In its
discussion of the public thoroughfare requirement, the court was less specific, indicating simply
that, "prior to the locking of the gates in the early 1990s, the roads were used as public
thoroughfares." R. at 414, j[6. Finally, with respect to the ten year public use requirement, the
court determined that the roads had been used "starting in 1960 until the early 1990's." R. at
413,H7.
In its conclusory paragraph, however, the Court shortened the period somewhat with
respect to the cutting off date. Specifically, the court determined that the roads had been used
continuously "for a period of well over ten years prior to 1989 when the Okelberrys began
locking the gates." R. at 413, ^[8. Thus, the court specifically concluded that "the public has
been effectively cut off from use of these public roads since 1989." R at 413, ^[8.
As discussed below, there is a presumption in favor of the property owner in cases
brought under § 72-5-104. This brief will accordingly assume that the narrowest dates prevail
and that the trial court's ruling was that the roads had been continuously used from 1960 until
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Those findings are the subject of the cross-appeal in this case, and will be discussed
below in section II of the Argument. Additionally, on its own initiative, the trial court
also determined that the principle of estoppel should be invoked to prevent the County
from asserting control over these roads. That issue will be discussed in section III.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in concluding that these roads had been abandoned to the
public under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. The trial court first erred by ignoring
uncontroverted evidence indicating that the Okelberrys had routinely expelled nonpermissive users from their roads. Second, the trial court erred by also ignoring
uncontroverted evidence indicating that there were gates across all of the roads in
question, and that those gates were routinely closed. Third, the evidence showed that the
gates had been locked and that there had been no trespassing signs alongside all of the
roads. Given this evidence, the trial court's ultimate determination that there had been ten
years of uninterrupted use by the public was simply incorrect and should be overturned.
In the alternative, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision to invoke the
estoppel principle in this case. Specifically, the trial court correctly recognized that a
governmental agency is not allowed to sit idly by while a landowner maintains his or her

1989. As will be set forth below in the Argument section, however, the slight difference that
may exist between 1957, 1958, 1959, or 1960 as a starting point, and 1989,1990, or 1991 as an
ending point will become meaningless given the years ultimately covered by the Okelberrys'
evidence.
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roads for a period of decades, only to then arbitrarily claim ownership at a time of the
government's choosing. As such, the estoppel ruling was correct.
ARGUMENT
I.

IN REVIEWING THE MERITS OF THIS APPEAL, THIS COURT'S
DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT IS LIMITED BY THE TRIAL
COURTS' OWN INDEPENDENT OBLIGATIONS TO PROTECT THE
RIGHTS OF PROPERTY OWNERS IN PUBLIC ROADS CASES.
As a threshold matter, the standard of appellate review that is applied to public

roads cases warrants some discussion. Under Utah Code Annotated § 72-5-104, a
privately owned highway is deemed to have been "dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public when it has been (1) continuously used (2) as a public thoroughfare (3) for a
period often years." (Numbering added). In enforcing the terms of § 72-5-104, the
courts have determined that appeals from § 72-5-104 rulings present mixed questions of
law and fact; as such, the trial court's factual findings are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard, while the "ultimate determination" as to § 72-5-104's applicability is
considered to be a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Heber City Corp. v.
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-10 (Utah 1997); see also AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005
UT App 168,1flJ7-8, 112 P.3d 1228.
While this mixed question standard of review is well accepted in the relevant
decisions, there is also a certain tension in those decisions regarding the actual degree of
deference that should be granted to the trial court's resolution of the second question-i.e.,
the ultimate determination as to whether the § 72-5-104 criteria have been met. In Heber
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City, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that although the ultimate determination is
ostensibly reviewed for correctness, the appellate courts still recognize that the
determination is "highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous." Heber City, 942
P.2d at 310. For this reason, the appellate courts have "historically . . . given trial courts a
fair degree of latitude in determining the legal consequences under section [72-5-104] of
facts found by the court."7 Id. at 309-10; see also Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962
P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Though subsequent decisions have reaffirmed the idea that this is a deferenceladen correctness review, the decisions have repeatedly noted that the appellate review
also takes into account the specific evidentiary requirements that are placed upon the trial
court in § 72-5-104 cases. Specifically, it is well accepted that a public road dedication
under § 72-5-104 is only proper where the trial court finds that clear and convincing
evidence supports the government's position. See Heber City, 942 P.2d at 310; AWINC
Corp., 2005 UT App 168 at f7; Campbell, 962 P.2d at 808. Additionally, the trial court is
required to view the evidence in these cases in light of the "presumption" that exists "in
favor of the property owner." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099
(Utah 1995) (quoting Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah
1981)).

7

Prior to 1998, the public dedication statute in question was designated as§ 27-12-89.
The above quotation from Heber City referred to the statute under its prior designation
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For purposes of review, then, the central question is what is exactly required in
order to meet the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard. Black's Law Dictionary
states that the standard requires a showing that "the thing to be proved is highly probable
or reasonably certain." Black's Law Dictionary, Evidence (8th ed. 2004). Similarly,
Corpus Juris Secundum states that "[ejvidence is clear and convincing if it places in the
fact finder an abiding conviction that the truth of the factual contentions is highly
probable," and that "clear and convincing evidence is that which leaves no reasonable
doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question." 32 A
C.J.S. Evidence § 1306 (2005); accord 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 157 (2005). The
standard requires "clear, explicit, and unequivocal evidence" that is "sufficiently strong to
command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind." 9A Am.Jur. PI. & Pr. Forms
Evidence § 140 (2005).
The reason for requiring this higher standard of proof in public road cases is clear.
As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he law does not lightly allow the transfer of
property from private to public use. . . . This higher standard of proof is demanded since
the ownership of property should be granted a high degree of sanctity and respect."
Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099. In an earlier public roads case, the Utah Supreme Court
similarly stressed that "[w]here individual property rights are at stake, we must not treat
such rights lightly." Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545, 546 (Utah 1968).
Thus, while the trial court's judgment is given a certain degree of deference on
appellate review, it is nevertheless also clear that this appellate deference is simply not
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absolute. Instead, in order to protect the important private property rights that are at stake
in these cases, the appellate court's review is only deferential to the extent that the
appellate court first concludes that the trial court has properly applied the clear and
convincing evidence standard to its own determination. To hold otherwise would be to
render the clear and convincing evidence standard meaningless, while at the same time
weakening the protections that are afforded to private property owners in these cases.
For these reasons, if the evidence in favor of dedication in this case is not "clear,
explicit, and unequivocal" such that there is "no reasonable doubt" regarding the
government's position, then the trial court's decision to publicly dedicate what had been
privately owned roads should be overturned by this Court.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THERE
WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE ROADS HAVE
BEEN ABANDONED TO THE PUBLIC.
As for the substantive requirements of § 72-5-104, the statute itself requires three

separate criteria to be established for a public dedication to occur: first, that the road was
used "continuously"; second, that the road was used as "a public thoroughfare"; and third,
that the road was continuously used as a public thoroughfare for at least a period of "ten
years."
The bulk of the analysis in the cases has focused on the first requirement, that of
"continuous use" by the public. It is well accepted that though the continuous use
requirement does not require the road to have been used on a day-to-day basis, see
Campbell 962 P.2d at 809 (stating that continuous use may be "continuous though not
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constant"), the public's ability to access the road still needs to have been unfettered and
unimpeded on any occasion on which members of the public tried entering. The County
must therefore show that "the public made a continuous and uninterrupted use o f the
contested road "as often as they found it convenient or necessary." AWINC Corp., 2005
UT App 168 at 1J11; accord Heber City, 942 P.2d at 310 (stating that the use must be
"without interruption"). Thus, it must be shown that members of the public used the
roads "as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass" and that those same
members were able to use the roads "whenever they found it necessary or convenient."
Campbell 962 P.2d at 809 {first emphasis in original; second emphasis added).
The reported cases are illustrative. In Draper City, the Utah Supreme Court
considered a case in which the city had brought suit against a rural landowner under § 725-104's predecessor statute. See generally 888 P.2d at 1098-99. The trial court had
granted summary judgment on behalf of the city; the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at
1101. In holding that the evidence did not support the public road determination, the
Supreme Court emphasized the fact that there had been intermittent interruptions in the
public's right to use the roads. Specifically, the evidence had shown that: (1) the
landowners had, on occasion, stopped persons who were using the roads and asked them
to leave; (2) the owners had posted "no trespassing" signs at the entrance to the roads; (3)
the owners had blocked the roads by digging trenches, stacking concrete blocks, and
creating obstructive piles of dirt and rocks; and (4) the owners had erected a gate at the
entrance to the roads. Id. at 1100. All of these acts were identified as interruptive acts by
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the Supreme Court. Particularly instructive for purposes of this appeal is the emphasis
that the Draper City Court placed on the fact that the owners had asked "some" persons to
leave the roads. IcL What is noteworthy about this is that the Supreme Court did not
require a showing that the owners had asked "all" trespassers to leave the roads. Instead,
the Supreme Court accepted as proof of interruption the mere assertion that "some"
persons had been asked to leave. Also significant is the Court's reliance on signs and
gates as evidence of interruption.
In Campbell this court similarly affirmed a decision of a lower court holding that a
public road had not been established. See generally 962 P.2d at 807-08. In so doing, this
Court determined that the continuous use requirement had not been satisfied because of
evidence showing (1) that the owners had placed a gate across the road in question, and
(2) that the gate had been locked during certain (but not all) months of the year. IcL at
808-09. As in Draper City, the court thus concluded that an interruption of public access,
however brief, is still sufficient to break off the ten year period of continuous public use,
thereby preserving the landowner's private property rights.
In contrast, the cases in which the Utah appellate courts have concluded that § 725-104 has been satisfied have been those in which the uncontroverted evidence showed
that there had been absolutely no interruption of the public's right to use the roads during
the requisite period. In Heber City, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed a
continuous use determination because of the fact that the "uncontradicted evidence
demonstrates that the public made a continuous and uninterrupted use" of the contested
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roads. 942 P.2d at 311 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), this Court affirmed a public road dedication where there was
"abundant, unrebutted evidence in support" showing continuous use. Id. at 913.
Specifically, the court emphasized the fact that the landowners had "not fence[d] off the
roadway," had "not post[ed] any signs, and in general [had] made no attempts to limit the
passage of the public." Id
In short, though the continuous use requirement remains a "fact-intensive" inquiry,
Heber City, 942 P.2d at 310, the controlling legal test is well-established. In order to
ensure that § 72-5-104 is not used to arbitrarily and unfairly deprive a landowner of his or
her property rights, the courts have insisted that the continuous use requirement is only
satisfied when the evidence showing uninterrupted use is unrebutted and uncontradicted.
If there has been competent or credible evidence of interruption, the continuous use
requirement has simply not been satisfied, and § 72-5-104 is inoperative.
As to the other § 72-5-104 factors, the second requirement is that there be a
showing that the contested road was used as a public thoroughfare. By definition, this
requirement is closely related to the continuous use requirement.8 Under the public
thoroughfare analysis, the question is whether the public had "a general right of passage"

8

Though each of the three § 72-5-104 elements "embodies a logically distinct
requirement that must be satisfied, the elements are so intertwined that they are not readily
susceptible to separate discussion. For example, it is difficult to analyze whether the 'use'
has been continuous without determining at the same time whether that 'use' has been as a
public thoroughfare." Heber City, 942 P.2d at 310 n.6. For this reason, a discussion of the
three elements necessarily involves a degree of "overlap." Id
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on the road in question. Heber City, 942 P.2d at 311. In making such a determination,
the road's designation (or lack thereof) on a map is not dispositive. IdL at 311 n. 8.9
Evidence showing that the road was used by either neighbors or by permissive users is
also not relevant. See AWINC Corp.. 2005 UT App 168 at W6-17; Campbell 962 P.2d
at 809. Instead, the public thoroughfare requirement requires the County to show that the
road was regularly used by non-neighbor, non-permissive members of the general public.
See AWINC Corp.. 2005 UT App 168 at 1ff[16-17. Finally, the County must show that the
public used the roads as a public thoroughfare without interruption for a period often
continuous years. Under Heber City, the rule is that the County can prevail on this factor
by showing that the other two requirements have been met with respect to any ten year
period in the road's history. See generally 942 P.2d at 313 n.12.
A.

The evidence supporting trial court's conclusion.

Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following
is the evidence that supports the trial court's conclusion that the roads were continuously
used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years.

9

Given that the public thoroughfare requirement focuses on the question of whether the
particular persons using the roads were doing so with or without permission, it makes sense that
designations on a map are not deemed relevant to the analysis. Indeed, the non-controlling
nature of such evidence was acknowledged at trial by Don Wood, a County employee who
testified on behalf of the County. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 25-26.
In spite of this, it is worth noting that some evidence was presented at this trial showing
that these roads had been charted on some government maps. The trial court did not reference
or rely on these map designations in either its original or supplemental rulings, however, and,
given the lack of legal relevance of these designations, this brief accordingly does not marshal
or discuss this evidence in the analysis.
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1.

Marshaled evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion regarding
Ridge Line.

Evidence regarding frequency of use: Dee Sabey testified that he had used the road
"lots of times in the summer" for weekend camping, and that he used the road "several
times" "every fall" during the deer hunt. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 38. James
Bessendorfer testified that he used the road "many times" every year until the gates were
locked. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 111-12. Martin Wall testified that he had used the
road "many times." Trial Transcript, June 28 at 191. Gerald Thompson testified that he
used the road "several times" per year during the hunting season, that he used it 1-2
additional times per year for picnics, and that his total usage amounted to approximately 5
times per year. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 233, 257. Ed Sabey "guessed" that he used
the road "several times a month." Trial Transcript, June 28 at 270.10 Dick Baum testified
that he used the road once a year for a biking trip. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 314.
Benny Gardner testified that he used the road 7-8 times per year. Trial Transcript, June
29 at 69. Brandon Richins testified that he has used it "quite frequently" since he

10

It is unclear whether Ed Sabey meant that he used the road several times a month in
the hunting season, several times a month in the summer months, or whether he was
somehow asserting that he used the road several times a month during the winter months as
well.
PAGE 25 OF 52

received his driver's license. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 10.11 Mark Butters testified that
he used the road twenty times per summer. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 103.i2
Evidence regarding permission: The following individuals testified that they had
never been asked to leave the road: Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 40; Martin
Wall, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 197; Ed Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 271.
Evidence regarding gates: The following individuals testified that the gates hadn't
been locked during the relevant period: Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 40; James
Bessendorfer, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 112; Martin Wall, Trial Transcript, June 28 at
192; Gerald Thompson, June 28 at 232; Ed Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 271; Mark
Butters, June 29 at 103.

n

B r a n d o n Richins was born in 1973, Trial Transcript, June 29 at 6, and testified that he
received his license in the summer of 1990. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 10. As indicated above,
this was the same time period in which the roads were permanendy locked.
12

Some of these witnesses also testified as to seeing unnamed other persons on the
roads as well. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, Dick Baum, June 28 at 319 (indicating that he
would sometimes see "someone" else up on the roads). In Draper City, the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether such testimony has any probative value in a § 72-5-104
case. See 888 P.2d at 1100. The Court concluded that such testimony does not have any
weight in a public roads case, noting that these other "users are not identified," and that there
would be no way to determine whether such users "had permission to use the road." IcL
In addition to the permission aspect identified in Draper City, there would also be an
open question as to whether any or all of these unnamed users had subsequently been asked
to leave, whether they had been obstructed by a locked gate, or whether they regarded the no
trespassing signs as evidence that they were in fact trespassing. As such, though it is
acknowledged that many of the County's witnesses described having seen other persons on
these roads, this testimony regarding unnamed users has no substantive value at all to this
case and is therefore not marshaled or discussed further in this brief.
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Evidence regarding signs: The following individuals testified that they had not
seen any signs during the relevant period: Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 39;
James Bessendorfer, June 28 at 112; Martin Wall, June 28 at 192, 197; Gerald Thompson,
June 28 at 232; Dick Baum, June 28 at 314; Mark Butters, June 29 at 103.
2.

Marshaled evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion regarding
Circle Springs.

Evidence regarding the frequency of use: Dee Sabey testified that he used the road
2-3 times per summer and then for the deer hunt "practically every fall." Trial Transcript,
June 28 at 33. James Bessendorfer testified that he used the road two to three times per
year during the 60s, 70s, and 80s. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 100. Martin Wall testified
that he didn't use the road every year, but that when he did, he would use it two to three
times in the year during the fall hunt. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 187. Gerald Thompson
indicated that he has walked the road one time. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 228. Ed
Sabey testified that he used the road "maybe twice a year, three times" a year during the
relevant period. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 266-67. Brandon Richins testified that he
had used the road sometime during his teenage years, while would have been post-1986.
Trial Transcript, June 29 at 8.13 Benny Gardner testified that he used the road "several
times" during the period from 1964 through 1999. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 66. Mark

13

Later in his testimony, however, Mr. Richie recanted and indicated that he has no clear
memory regarding Circle Springs. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 21-22.
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Butters testified that he used the road approximately 20 times per summer. Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 102.
Evidence regarding permission: The following individuals testified that they had
never been asked to leave the road or had seen anyone else be asked to leave the road:
Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 35; James Bessendorfer, Trial Transcript, June 28
at 104; Martin Wall, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 190; Brandon Richins, Trial Transcript,
June 29 at 10.
Evidence regarding gates: The following individuals testified that the gates hadn't
been locked during the relevant period: Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 35; James
Bessendorfer, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 104; Martin Wall, Trial Transcript, June 28 at
187-88; Ed Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 268; Brandon Richins, Trial Transcript,
June 29 at 10; Benny Gardner, Trial Transcript, June 29 at 63 (testifying that there were
no locked gates in the 1960s).
Evidence regarding signs. The following individuals testified that they had not
seen any no trespassing signs during the relevant period: Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript,
June 28 at 34; Ed Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 288; Brandon Richins, Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 9; Benny Gardner, Trial Transcript, June 29 at 63.
3.

Marshaled evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion regarding
Thornton Hollow.

Evidence regarding frequency of use: Dee Sabey testified that he had used the road
"off and on" from the 1960s to 1980s. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 42-43. James
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Bessendorfer testified that he had used the road approximately six times per year. Trial
Transcript, June 28 at 117. Martin Wall testified that he had used the road for hunting.
Trial Transcript, June 28 at 193. Gerald Thompson testified that he had used the road in
the 1960s and 1970s. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 235. Ed Sabey testified that he had
used the road once or twice a month during the summer. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 272.
Brandon Richins testified that he used the road when he was younger. Trial Transcript,
June 29 at 15.14 Benny Gardner testified that he had used the road 6-7 times per year
since the 1980s. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 70. Mark Butters testified that he had used
the road between 1967 and 1994. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 105.
Evidence regarding permission: The following individuals testified that they had
never been asked to leave the road or had seen anyone else be asked to leave the road:
Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 44; James Bessendorfer, Trial Transcript, June 28
at 120; Benny Gardner, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 70;
Evidence regarding gates: The following individuals testified that the gates hadn't
been locked during the relevant period: Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 43; James
Bessendorfer, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 118; Mark Butters, Trial Transcript, June 29 at
105.
Evidence regarding signs: The following individuals testified that they had not
seen any no trespassing signs during the relevant period: Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript,

14

Later in his testimony, however, Mr. Richie recanted and indicated that he has no clear
memory regarding Thornton Hollow. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 21-22.
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June 28 at 43; Gerald Thompson, June 28 at 236; Benny Gardner, Trial Transcript, June
29 at 72 (testifying that he had seen the signs, but that he thought they were only for the
property).
4.

Marshaled evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion regarding
Parker Canyon.

Evidence regarding frequency of use: Dee Sabey testified that he used the road
"several times" per year during the hunting season. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 46.
Gerald Thompson testified that he used the road for hunting. Trial Transcript, June 28 at
238. Brandon Richie, who was born in 1973, testified that he used it "all his life." Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 16.1:> Benny Gardner testified that he has used it 4-5 times per year.
Trial Transcript, June 29 at 76. Mark Butters testified that he has used the road
approximately fifty times since 1960. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 106.16
Evidence regarding permission: The following individuals testified that they had
never been asked to leave the road or had seen anyone else be asked to leave the road:
Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 47; Mark Butters, Trial Transcript, June 29 at 106.
Evidence regarding gates: The following individuals testified that the gates hadn't
been locked during the relevant period: Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 48; James

15

Later in his testimony, however, Mr. Richie recanted and indicated that he has no clear
memory regarding this road. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 31.
16

James Bessendorfer also testified to use, but, as a member of West Daniels, his use was
permissive. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 121.
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Bessendorfer, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 125; Ed Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 278;
Wayne Robertson, Trial Transcript, June 30 at 15.
Evidence regarding signs: The following individuals testified that they had not
seen any no trespassing signs during the relevant period: Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript,
June 28 at 47; James Bessendorfer, June 28 at 125; Ed Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at
278; Mark Butters, Trial Transcript at 107.
B.

In spite of the above-listed evidence, the trial court's ultimate
determination that the roads were continuously used by the public for a
period often years is incorrect.

As discussed above, the trial court could only conclude that the roads were
abandoned to the public under § 72-5-104 if it properly determined that there was clear
and convincing evidence that the public had used the roads without interruption from
1960 through 1989. Though the County did present this evidence tending to show that
certain members of the public were able to repeatedly trespass on these privately owned
roads, that evidence is nevertheless fatally flawed for three different reasons. First, the
County has failed to rebut the Okelberrys' supported assertions that they and their agents
routinely ejected persons from the roads who did not have permission to be there.
Second, the County has also failed to rebut the Okelberrys' supported assertions that there
were gates across each of the roads that were kept closed. Third, though there is some
dispute about the time periods in which the gates were locked and in which the no
trespassing signs were posted, the evidence presented by the Okelberrys regarding the
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existence of these two interruptive obstacles was sufficient to defeat any claim of clear
and convincing evidence showing abandonment.
1.

The Okelberrys presented unrebutted evidence showing that they had
expelled persons who did not have permission to use the roads.

First, the County's case was reliant upon the testimony of a series of witnesses
who were by their own assertions only part- time, intermittent users of the roads. With
slight variations in frequency, the testimony was generally that the roads were used by
these witnesses on a limited number of occasions during the summer, and then again
during the 2-3 week long hunting season in the fall.
In terms of claimed usage, the notable high point in the County's case was Mark
Butters. In spite of the fact that virtually all of the evidence supported the notion that
these roads are rough and very difficult to traverse, as well as the fact that the County's
other witnesses generally claimed usage rates of no more than 5-6 times during a given
summer, Mark Butters nevertheless testified that he uses the Ridge Line and Circle
Springs roads approximately 20 times per summer. Assuming arguendo that this
particular statement was true, and that by the term ^summer" Mr. Butters was referring to
the months of June, July, and August, it is worth noting that Mr. Butters was still only
asserting that he used these roads at a rate of somewhere close to 1 Vi times per week. The
other witnesses, of course, were claiming usage at rates much lower than that.
Given the intermittent nature of these witnesses' claimed usage, it is therefore
clear that even the County's most persistent witnesses were by their own terms simply not
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in a position to rebut the Okelberrys' insistence that uninvited persons had been asked to
leave the roads ever since the Okelberrys purchased the property. Thus, when Ray
Okelberry testified that he and his father were granting permission to users as far back as
1957, there was no contrary evidence that could disprove this assertion. When Brian
Okelberry testified that he and his family had routinely limited access to the roads by
granting or withdrawing permission, there was no contrary evidence that could disprove
this assertion. When Bruce Huvard testified that, at the Okelberrys' request, he had been
exercising his authority since 1966 to kick people off the roads if he came upon them,
there was no contrary evidence that could disprove this assertion. When Jeff Jefferson
testified that, at least since 1977, he and the other Okelberry employees had been
instructed to approach non-permissive users and ask them to leave, there was no contrary
evidence that could disprove this assertion. When Mel Price, Glenn Shepherd, and Shane
Ford all testified that they and other persons they knew had sought for and received
permission to use these roads, this testimony wholly comported with the testimony of the
Okelberrys and their agents, and there was no contrary evidence that could disprove the
contention that this was part of a repeated pattern of conduct since 1957.
Because § 72-5-104 requires clear and convincing evidence of uninterrupted use,
the testimony of these witnesses regarding the repeated expulsions of non-permissive
users should have been deemed conclusive as to the roads that were under the Okelberrys'
control. Other than showing that this particular collection of admittedly intermittent,
admittedly spasmodic users had each managed to use these rural roads on occasion
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without being stopped, the County simply presented no other evidence that contradicted
the claim that other persons were in fact being expelled from the property, or that instead
showed that the Okelberrys and their witnesses were lying when they testified otherwise.
Given the importance placed upon this very same type of behavior in Draper City, the
trial court in this case therefore should have concluded that the evidence of uninterrupted
use was not clear and convincing on this basis alone. On the basis of this factor alone, the
trial court can and should be overturned.
2.

The Okelberrys presented unrebutted evidence showing that they had
controlled access to the roads through gates.

Second, the County's own witnesses repeatedly acknowledged that there have
always been gates across these roads during the relevant period.17 This question of
whether a closed gate must be locked in order to qualify as an interruptive act for
purposes of § 72-5-104 has not been definitively addressed by a Utah appellate court.18 In
this case, the trial court specifically noted that the gates were often closed, but then
concluded that a closed yet unlocked gate was not interruptive for purposes of § 72-5104. See Trial Transcript, June 30 at 154-55; R. at 415, ffl[3-4. That conclusion should be
rejected as a matter of law.

17

There was also evidence in this case indicating that those gates were periodically
locked. The legal significance of those locks will be discussed in the next section.
18

This issue appears to have been raised in Chapman v. Uintah County, 2003 UT App
383, 81 P.3d 761, but was not ultimately reached by the panel. See kL at 1fl[24-26.
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As discussed above, the question under the continuous use requirement is whether
the public's right to use the road was interrupted or "limited." Heber City, 942 P.2d at
311 n.9. Though some cases have considered the impact of locked gates on the
continuous use inquiry, see, e.g., Campbell 962 P.2d at 809, it is significant that a
number of the cases have also considered the presence of gates as an interruptive force
without deeming it necessary to even note whether those gates were locked. See, e.g..
Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1100; AWINC Corp., 2005 UT App 168 at p , 11-12; Kohler,
916P.2dat913.
There are strong policy reasons for allowing a gate to act as an interruptive force,
even in the absence of any evidence showing that that gate was locked. As indicated
above, the Utah courts have long sought to achieve a balance between the competing
interests that are at work in the § 72-5-104 cases. On the one hand, the government
clearly has an interest in preserving the public's right to use roads that have been left to
the public for a lengthy period of time. It is instructive in this regard that the statute itself
only calls for public dedication where the landowners have "abandoned" the road.
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). In a very real sense, the prevailing logic here is one
of reliance. If an owner has completely "abandoned" a particular road for such a lengthy
period of time, it stands to reason that the public will have developed collective patterns
of travel, commerce, and development during that time that would track and be reliant
upon the existence of this "public thoroughfare." This is exactly what happened, for
example, in the Heber City case. In that case, the road in question had continuously been
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used by the public from 1947 until 1989. 942 P.2d at 313. Not only did a "number of
businesses" spring up alongside the road, but the road also became a primary means of
reaching the airport. Id at 312. In such circumstances, it would indeed be unjust to allow
a long absent landowner to suddenly emerge, claim ownership, and restrict the public's
right to use a road that had never before been treated as anything but public.
On the other hand, where the landowner has taken some recognizable steps to
assert some control over the roads, the public will be under no such illusions. For
example, in a case involving rural roads that are crossed by unlocked gates, a member of
the public who wished to use the roads would still have to physically stop their car, get
out, open the gate, drive through the gate, and then get out again to close the gate before
proceeding onward. This is precisely what happened here, for example, with many of the
County's own witnesses testifying that the gates were always kept closed as a means of
keeping the Okelberrys' livestock within the property. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, June 28
at 40 (testimony of Dee Sabey); Trial Transcript, June 28 at 314 (testimony of Dick
Baum); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 119, 123 (testimony of Mark Butters). As such, the
members of the public who used these roads were always presented with a reminder upon
both ingress and egress that these roads belonged to some other party, and that use of
these roads was solely at the pleasure of that owner.
As indicated above, the law does not lightly allow the public takeover of a private
property owner's land. The statute at issue in this case does not require a landowner to
come up with an expensive, elaborate, or foolproof system for keeping out all trespassers.
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Instead, the statute allows the property owner to preserve his or her rights by simply
creating some interruptive obstacle that limits the public's access to the private roads.
Given the large number of rural ranches and farms in this state that are separated from the
highways by nothing more than a wire fence or gate, this Court should reject the trial
court's decision to read into the statute a heretofore non-existent requirement that all of
those gates and fences actually be locked. Instead, this Court should affirm the obvious,
common-sense reading of the statute, thereby holding that a landowner who has preserved
and maintained a gate or fence across his or her road cannot be said to have "abandoned"
that road under § 72-5-104. For this reason, this Court can and should conclude that there
was not clear and convincing evidence showing that the roads involved in this appeal
were ever abandoned to the public.
3.

The quantum of evidence regarding locks and signs contradicts the
trial court's finding of clear and convincing evidence.

Third, the Okelberrys presented a sufficient quantum of evidence at trial to
establish that there had been no trespassing signs alongside the roads. As discussed
above, many of the witnesses discussed the presence of signs alongside this road system
in general terms. See Trial Transcript, June 30 at 137 (testimony of Ray Okelberry); Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 257-58, 268-69 (testimony of Bruce Huvard); Trial Transcript, June
29 at 160 (testimony of Mel Price); Trial Transcript, June 30 at 25 (testimony of Brian
Okelberry); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 135 (testimony of Jeff Jefferson). Other
witnesses were more specific as to the particular signs they saw upon particular roads.

PAGE 37 OF 52

With respect to Parker Canyon, both Mel Price and Glen Shepher testified that they had in
fact seen no trespassing signs on that road. See Trial Transcript, June 29 at 161; Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 212. With respect to Thornton Hollow, Mark Butters, testifying for
the County, testified that he had seen no trespassing signs as well. Trial Transcript, June
29 at 106. Similar testimony was elicited with respect to Circle Springs. Trial Transcript,
June 29 at 161 (testimony of Mel Price).
It is true that the County presented a number of witnesses who denied having seen
such signs. In an ordinary circumstance, the presentation of such conflicting testimony
would allow the trial court to make a determination that would be granted deference by
the appellate court. In this circumstance, however, the inquiry is whether the trial court's
conclusion that the evidence regarding the signs had not been posted was "clear and
convincing." In light of the conflicting evidence regarding this issue, this Court should
accordingly conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish the existence of these
no trespassing signs, and that those signs then showed there to have been an interruption
in the public's right to continuously use the roads as a public thoroughfare.
As for the question of whether the gates were locked, the evidence that was
presented at trial indicated that the Okelberrys had in fact locked the gates that controlled
access to their roads. Ray Okelberry, for example, specifically testified that he had begun
locking the exterior gates since the late 1950s, and that he had also made a habit of
locking the gates every year while moving his own sheep. Trial Transcript, June 30 at

PAGE 38 OF 52

138-39. His assertion that the gates were at least periodically locked was also supported
by Mel Price. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 160, 170.
It is true that many of the County's witnesses testified that they had not
encountered locks on the gates until the late 1980s. This discrepancy is, however,
explainable on at least two levels. First, the testimony at trial was that the gates and the
locks were repeatedly torn down through the years by trespassers and hunters. For
example, Jeff Jefferson, the longtime Okelberry employee, testified that one wire gate had
ultimately been replaced by an iron gate "because every week-you could put up the gate
and the next day it would be ripped out." Trial Transcript, June 29 at 134; accord Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 186-87, 197-98 (testimony of Lee Okelberry); Trial Transcript,
June 30 at 137-39 (testimony of Ray Okelberry). Second, as discussed above, none of the
witnesses who testified on behalf of the County were anything but sporadic users of the
roads. According to his testimony, Ray Okelberry testified that he was at the very least
locking the gates for a short period every summer while he moved his sheep. Depending
on the vagaries of chance and timing, such short term, periodic locking would not
necessarily have impacted the County's collection of admittedly intermittent witnesses.
Regardless, the trial court ultimately concluded that the Okelberrys had been
locking the gates at least on a periodic basis prior to 1989. See Supplemental Findings,
R. at 488, f 5 ("At various times in the past, the Okelberrys and their employees have
locked these gates. Beginning in the 1990s, the Okelberrys began locking these gates on
a more permanent basis"). This finding has not been challenged on appeal by the County,
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and must therefore be accepted as true by this Court. As such, the only way that the trial
court's ultimate determination is sustainable is if this Court determines that periodic
locking of gates is not sufficient to cut off § 72-5-104's continuous use requirement. Such
a conclusion, however, would clearly contradict both the statute and the cases.
In short, a determination that a landowner has abandoned his or her road to the
public is only permissible where there is clear and convincing evidence that any member
of the public was able to use the road whenever that member so desired. All that the
County was able to show in this case, however, was that certain members of the public
had been able to use the roads during their own periodic forays into the area. That is not
enough.
The trial court erred because it failed to properly recognize the legal impact of the
Okelberry's evidence. Specifically, the unrebutted evidence showing that the Okelberrys
had expelled non-permissive users of the roads was enough to defeat the County's claim
of abandonment. The unrebutted evidence showing that the public had had to cross
through the gates when crossing onto these roads was likewise enough to defeat the claim
of abandonment. Finally, the evidence showing both a periodic locking of the gates and
the presence of no trespassing signs should at the very least have prevented the trial court
from concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence of non-interruption.
For these reasons, the trial court's ultimate determination that these roads have
been abandoned to the public should therefore be overturned.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT
THE COUNTY SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING CONTROL
OVER THE ROADS IN QUESTION.
Although the trial court initially concluded that the roads in question were

continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years, the trial court also
determined that the County should be prevented from asserting control over the roads
under principles of estoppel. By definition, the court's estoppel ruling was only necessary
because of the initial determination that § 72-5-104 had been satisfied. Because that
determination was in error, this Court should simply reverse that ruling and resolve this
appeal on that issue alone. Should this Court determine that a ruling on the estoppel issue
is necessary, however, Appellants suggest that that ruling be upheld.
In general, an estoppel determination is appropriate where there is
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a
claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on
the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3)
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that this case does indeed satisfy the three
prongs of the general estoppel rule. First, assuming that the trial court's determination
regarding the roads' abandonment in 1970 is correct,19 the County has wholly failed to act

19

As discussed above, the trial court appears to have ruled that the uninterrupted public
use began in 1960, and that it continued for a period of at least ten years thereafter. As such,
under the terms of § 72-5-104, the roads would have become public as of 1970.
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in a manner consistent with its current assertions of ownership. Specifically: (1) the
County has never maintained the roads, instead leaving that difficult task to the
Okelberrys and their employees (see Supplemental Findings at Tf2-3; Trial Transcript,
June 29 at 177); (2) the County has allowed the Okelberrys to put up no trespassing signs
alongside the roads (discussed infra); (3) the County has allowed the Okelberrys to
maintain and periodically lock the gates are placed across these roads (discussed infra);
(4) the County has allowed the Okelberrys to require uninvited persons to leave the roads
upon demand (discussed infra); (5) the County has allowed the Okelberrys to sell trespass
permits for use of the roads (discussed infra); and (6) the County has allowed the
Okelberrys to enter into private contracts with private hunting units, whereby the
Okelberrys have purported to sell the rights to restrict use of these roads (see
Supplemental Findings at f^|9-10). Each of these acts are acts that are manifestly
impermissible on any public road by any private party. Taken either individually or
collectively, the County's current position is therefore inconsistent with its prior conduct.
Second, the private owners of these roads have acted in reliance upon their belief
that these roads are privately owned. The evidence presented at trial both explicitly and
implicitly indicated that the Okelberrys have spent over 50 years developing a successful
grazing operation on these lands. These efforts have included, of course, the efforts that
have been expended in maintaining the gates and locks and the work that obviously goes
into keeping such roads clear of trees and debris. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, June 29 at
218; Trial Transcript, June 30 at 26; Trial Transcript, June 30 at 126-29. The evidence
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also indicated that, in spite of their significant efforts, the Okelberrys have been unable to
keep the trespassers and private hunters off of their land. See Trial Transcript, June 29 at
215 (testimony of Glen Shepherd); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 261 (testimony of Bruce
Huvard); Trial Transcript, June 39 at 137 (testimony of Ray Okelberry). Further,
testimony was presented at trial showing that the trespassers upon the roads very often
left the roads and then trespassed upon the Okelberry property itself. See Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 26 (Brandon Richins admitting that he'd often drive onto the
private property to get around fallen trees); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 149 (Jeff Jefferson
testifying that "most of the time when people came on there they wouldn't stay on the
road"); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 190-194 (testimony of Lee Okelberry describing how
he often caught trespassers gathering wood or hunting on the Okelberrys' private ground).
Given the obvious harm that such unfettered use could do to the Okelberrys' operations, it
seems clear that the Okelberrys would not have developed this operation in this location if
the County had asserted its control over these roads sooner.
Third, the evidence that was presented at trial did indicate that the Okelberrys
would suffer injury if the roads were opened to the public. This injury would occur on
two levels. First, Ray Okelberry testified that the opening these roads would result in an
increase in pedestrian traffic on his property. See generally Trial Transcript, June 30 at
138-41. Given the sensitive nature of his livestock operation, Ray Okelberry testified that
he would in fact be put out of business by such a decision. Id Second, it was well
established at trial that the Okelberrys have financially benefitted from the presence of
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controlled, private hunting units on their property. Shane Ford, who currently runs the
unit on the Okelberry property, specifically testified that his unit is benefitted by having
exclusive access. For example, when asked whether his own interests would be served by
keeping the roads private, Mr Ford indicated that "I shouldn't have any competition on
my CWMU." Trial Transcript, June 29 at 246. He then indicated that though he
currently has a "ten year lease with Mr. Okelberry right now, but there's, you know,
there's some other things involved with that." Trial Transcript, June 29 at 249. The trial
court apparently interpreted this last comment to mean that Mr. Ford would get out of his
lease with the Okelberrys if the roads were opened to the public. In light of the specific
nature of the CWMU, such a finding is supportable.
In its opening brief, the County has nevertheless argued that estoppel is
inappropriate against the government. As a general matter, it is true that the courts
ordinarily disfavor attempts to invoke estoppel against the government. The fact that
estoppel is usually disfavored as against the government, however, obviously does not
preclude a court from determining that a particular situation warrants application of the
principle. In Eldredge, for example, this Court specifically held that estoppel can be
applied against the government "in unusual circumstances where it is plain that the
interests of justice so require." 795 P.2d at 675. This Court then held that estoppel was
appropriate in that case because "the failure to apply the doctrine could allow the whim of
an administrative body to bankrupt [the private party], which had acted in good faith in
reliance upon a solemn written commitment." Id at 676. This Court also emphasized the
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fact that estoppel can be invoked against the government in certain circumstances in order
to ensure that the government is "scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens." Id In
Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme
Court again emphasized that estoppel should be invoked against the government
sparingly. In so holding, however, the court reaffirmed the rule that estoppel can be
invoked against the government in "unusual circumstances where it is plain that the
interests of justice so require" it. Id. at 827.
It is true that, as in Eldredge, the Anderson Court's review of the applicable law
stressed the fact that the governmental estoppel cases ordinarily involve "very specific
written representations by authorized government entities." Id It is also true that there
are no such written representations in the record regarding this particular case. Anderson
is distinguishable, however, on two levels. First, Anderson did not actually require a
written representation as a precondition for governmental estoppel. Instead, it simply
indicated that the prior cases had ordinarily "involved" such representations. See id. at
827-28. Though subtle, there is a marked difference between a court indicating that "the
few cases in which Utah courts have permitted estoppel against the government have
involved' written representations, as was the case in Anderson, and the different situation
in which a court instead indicates that such a written representations are "required"-a rule
that has never been enforced or even specifically contemplated by any Utah appellate
court.
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Second, the unique nature of public roads cases indicates that the insistence that
there be written representations from the government prior to the private party's reliance
is a requirement that should be simply deemed inapplicable in the § 72-5-104 cases.
Unlike other situations where estoppel has been invoked against the government, the
erstwhile defendants in these public road cases are rarely, if ever, in formal discussions
with the government agency prior to the filing of suit-thus rendering this requirement
practically useless in this particular area of law.
A look at the situations where written representations have been invoked is
instructive. For example, in Eldredge, the issue was whether the state could be estopped
from denying the appellant's claim that he was entitled to be credited with a certain
number of years for purposes of his retirement. See generally 795 P.2d at 672-75. At
issue in the estoppel claim was the fact that, in deciding whether to retire in the first
instance, the claimant had first discussed the matter in conversation and writing with
various state agents. See id. Such conversations would obviously be expected of persons
contemplating retirement, thus lending support to the rule's applicability in those cases.
Similarly, Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah
1979), involved a business owner who had received written assurances that his business
was zoning compliant, and who then had spent several hundred thousand dollars on his
business in reliance on those assurances. After the licensing agency changed its mind, the
owner invoked estoppel as a means of preventing the government from declaring him to
be in violation. See generally id. at 689-95. As with the situation in Eldredge, the
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decision to undertake expensive improvements obviously presents the classic scenario in
which the citizen's action would ordinarily be preceded by official communications-thus
lending itself to a writing-specific rule for estoppel.
By contrast, the defendants who are sued in these public road cases very often
seem to have no idea that the government even had the ability to assert a claim to their
roads until the suit had actually been filed. In this case, for example, not only was there
no evidence that the County had ever spent any money improving the roads in question,
but there was also no evidence that the County had ever even discussed these roads with
any of the owners. Instead, the County allowed these owners to proceed along with their
businesses for a period of decades, completely unaware that the County was choosing to
bide its time until it felt like actually claiming control over these "abandoned" roads.
Without some provocation of some sort by the County, it is difficult to imagine why these
or any other rural property owners would ever even think it necessary to demand
assurances from the government that they in fact own their own roads, particularly given
that these owners had already spent money purchasing these roads, and had then spent
several decades paying property taxes on them. See Supplemental Findings at 484
(noting that 'The County has itself treated the roads as the Okelberrys' private property
by collecting property taxes on the land.").
It is thus significant that when the Utah Supreme Court considered the issue of
estoppel against the government in a recent public roads case, the Court did not invoke
the written representation requirement. See Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No.
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1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). Though the Court did indicate
that it was still "extremely reluctant to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion
of rights in a public highway by a government entity," id., the Court simply did not
require anything beyond the usual showing of reliance and detriment that is ordinarily
required in estoppel cases. See id. This holding comports with the prior precedent from
the Utah Supreme Court and from other jurisdictions supporting the conclusion that
estoppel can be invoked in public roads cases. See, e.g.. Premium Oil v. Cedar City, 187
P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1947) (holding that estoppel was appropriate against the government
in a public road case where the government had allowed the private party to maintain a
fence across the road and enact other improvements); Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P. 766,
768-69 (Utah 1917); 39 Am.Jur. 2d Highways, Streets & Bridges § 179 (2005)
(concluding that a government agency may be estopped to "open or use a street
theretofore created" under some "exceptional circumstances").
In preemptive response to this position, the County has asserted that even if a
written representation isn't required, the estoppel claim fails in this case because there
was not even a direct statement, verbal or written, upon which the landowners could rely.
The problem with this position, of course, is that the law of estoppel has never required
there to be a direct statement at all. Instead, the law has traditionally allowed for estoppel
to be invoked where one party has relied on another party's inaction. These road cases
provide a clear example of how this principle can and should operate. As indicated
above, the County in this case has allowed the land owners to engage in a number of
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activities that are wholly incompatible with private use, such as fencing and control over
use. It is the County's inaction in the face of such private control that forms the basis for
the estoppel claim.
To illustrate this principle, suppose for a moment that we're not dealing with the
rural roads in question here, but that we were instead dealing with a newly constructed
subdivision for which a county has constructed the internal roads. In spite of the county's
efforts in building the roads, suppose that the developer was then allowed to construct a
gate across the roads leading into the subdivision, periodically lock those gates, routinely
charge persons fees for entrance and for use of the internal roads, and then expel persons
found to be using the roads without permission. Suppose that the developer was also
allowed to engage in these behaviors without governmental opposition or even comment
for a period of decades, and that the developer was then allowed to enter into other
contractual arrangements that were clearly based upon the developer's continued control
of these roads. If a subsequent lawsuit arose regarding the roads, surely the government's
longstanding inaction in the face of the developer's blatant assertions of control could and
would be regarded as an affirmative representation indicating governmental nonownership. That is exactly the principle that ought to be invoked here.
The County next argues that a policy allowing private citizens to invoke estoppel
against the government in these cases would be unworkable insofar as the "there is simply
too much land owned by the government for it to adequately protect the public's interest
if, simply by its inaction, it could lose the public's rights." Appellants' Brief at *8. The
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problem with this argument is that it has the actors exactly backwards. By its terms, § 725-104 does not provide private citizens with a mechanism for taking property from the
government at all. Instead, the sole design and function of the statute is to allow the
government to take property away from private citizens. Thus, the only instances in
which this rule would be applicable would be in cases like this one in which the
government is trying to obtain control over roads that have long since been in the
exclusive control of a private landowner. There would be no impact at all on the
government's own holdings.
Thus, this case presents this Court with the opportunity to recognize that, for
purposes of governmental estoppel, public road cases are different than other types of
cases. Simply put, the government should not be allowed to sit idly by while landowners
fashion lives and businesses around roads that they have purchased and maintained, only
to then turn around and claim ownership of the roads after decades of non-involvement.
By the same token, the government also should not be allowed to accept property tax
payments on roads, only to then declare that those roads had been abandoned all along.
For these reasons, the estoppel ruling was appropriate and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that the trial court erred in concluding that the roads in this
case had been abandoned to public use. In the alternative, this Court should hold that the
estoppel ruling was correct.
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